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In 1973-1974, the U.S. faced the so-called “Energy Crisis” due to the Arab oil 
embargo and a quadrupling of world crude oil prices by OPEC.  This led the U.S. to use a” 
Price Control” policy in the domestic energy market.  The effects of such policy are explored 
and well documented.  However, the responses of OPEC producers to such a policy need 
further attention.  This paper examines the effects of these price controls on OPEC‟s 
extraction path.  It also examines the relation between the harm function and the change in 
OPEC production.  The results show some evidence that OPEC did respond differently to 
price controls applied by the U.S.  For some periods it cut production, while in other periods 
production levels increased.  The results also show some evidence regarding Wirl (2008) that 
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Gasoline is one of the major fuels consumed in the U.S. and the main product refined 
from crude oil.  Over the last 20 years, changes in crude oil prices have explained 85 percent 
of the changes in the price of gasoline in the U.S.  This indicates that the world price of crude 
oil is the primary explanatory factor of the price of gasoline.   
In 1973-1974, the U.S. faced the so-called “Energy Crisis” due to the Arab oil 
embargo and a quadrupling of world crude oil prices by OPEC.  This crisis caused dramatic 
social, political, and economic changes, and led the U.S. to use a “Price Control” policy in 
the domestic energy market.  Under these price control policies, the U.S. set different oil 
prices to insulate the U.S. economy and market participants from the dramatic increase in 
foreign oil prices. 
A large literature has looked at the welfare losses of price controls in energy markets.  
Agarwal and Deacon (1985) looked at the petroleum industry price and allocation controls in 
the U.S. during the I970‟s, and they found that regulations consistently kept price below 
marginal cost, causing the overall volume of refined product output to be excessive and this 
led  to inefficient distribution of the product to consumers.  Camm (1983) discussed the 
impacts of the price control policy on gasoline customers.  He shows that customers were 
paying higher prices than the regulated prices due to the long time wait and cost of wasted 
time.  Frech and Lee (1987) showed how to ration a good across markets (rationing-by-
queuing.), while doing the least harm to consumer welfare.  They provide empirical estimates 
from U.  S. gasoline crises of 1973-1974 and 1979 of the extra welfare losses caused by 
misallocation of gasoline between urban and rural markets.  Smith and Phelps (1978) looked 
at the impact of price controls on U.S. domestic oil production.  They showed that price 
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controls during 1974-76 have generated a perverse supply curve such that future increases in 
real world oil prices will transfer proportionately more U. S. income to OPEC than past price 
increases.  Kalt (1981) showed that price controls have an ambiguous effect on total domestic 
output.  This is due to the fact that price controls can either raise or lower the value of current 
rents relative to the value of future rents, causing the time path of extraction from existing 
reserves to be ambiguous.  Also price controls reduce the absolute present value of the 
streams of rents going to producers, resulting in reduction in exploration and development of 
new reserves.  Kalt found that price controls caused a deadweight loss to the U.S. economy 
ranging from $1-5 billion yearly.   
On the whole, the effects of price controls on crude oil producers and refiners in the 
U.S. have been explored and well documented (Kalt, 1981).  However, the responses of 
OPEC producers to such a policy need further attention.  This paper tests empirically the 
effect of the U.S. price control policies on OPEC‟s decisions, and explores if OPEC‟s 
behavior was affected by these policies, particularly the oil extraction decisions of OPEC.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section II gives a brief description of the history of oil 
price control policies in the U.S.  Section III examines the effects of these price controls on 
OPEC.  Section IV reports the findings of the relation between the harm function and the 
change in OPEC‟s production, and finally, Section V concludes. 
II. The History of Oil Price Control Policies in the U.S.  
Kalt (1981) explored and well documented the U.S. price controls and regulations 
imposed on refined products and crude oil, and their significant negative effects on oil 
producers and consumers alike.  He shows that the period for these controls extends from 
1970 – 1991.  These policies started with the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.  Phase I of 
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this Act lasted from August to November 1971; Phase II lasted from November 1971 to 
January 1973; and Phase III lasted from January 1973 to August 1973.  By the end of 1973, 
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 created pressures on the petroleum industry, and 
these pressures lead to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA).  The EPAA was 
used till February 1976 where the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) was an 
amendment to the EPAA which took effect in February 1976.  The EPCA formally expired in 
September 1981, as the Congress did not make an effort to reauthorize the program.  
To replace the EPAA/EPCA, the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax (WPT) was enacted 
in April 1980.  The name of this tax was a bit misleading, as this was not a tax on profits, but 
rather an excise tax on domestic oil production, effective March 1, 1980.  The Windfall Profit 
Tax was scheduled to expire over 33 months, after January 1988, no later than January 1991. 
III. The Effects of the U.S. Price Controls on OPEC 
The major issue in this section is to examine how OPEC responded to the price 
controls adopted by the U.S.  In other words, did OPEC cut production during the time 
periods in which the U.S. adopted the price control policies, or these policies had no effect at 
all on OPEC‟s oil extraction decisions?   
OPEC‟s oil production and reserves are the levels reported by OPEC in its Annual 
Statistical Bulletin for different years (1989-2007).  OPEC„s Annual Statistical Bulletin 
provides data about world energy markets.  It contains statistical data regarding the oil and 
gas activities of OPEC„s member countries (Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela), as 
well as the global petroleum industry in general.  It also provides comprehensive and detailed 
data on upstream and downstream activities, and the global flows of oil and gas, in addition 
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to basic financial data about some of the world„s largest oil and gas companies.  Crude oil 
production and exports for OPEC Members from 1970 – 2007 are in 1,000 b/day.   
To explore the response of OPEC to the U.S. price controls, we start by detrending 
the secular production levels of OPEC.  This is done by regressing OPEC‟s production levels 
from 1960 to 2007 on a time index, ranging from linear up to a sixth order polynomial.  
Then, by calculating the Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC), the best detrending model will 
be identified as the one with the minimum SIC.
1
  Using this criterion, the secular production 
trend was best captured by a sixth order polynomial trend.  
The residuals from this trend capture the effects of the unobservable factors on 
production levels such as cost, expectations and more, including the response of OPEC to the 
price control policies.  Now, one can argue that these residuals may be used to show and test 
the impact of the price control policies on OPEC‟s production.  The residuals from this trend 
are displayed in Figure 1.  The plotted residuals show some evidence that the production 
levels were lower in years 1975, 1976, 1979, 1981-1986, and 1988, when compared to years 
before and after.  This is how one can attribute the negative deviations from the secular trend 
for these years.  Now, do these reductions in OPEC production reflect responses to the price 
controls or not?  To test what we observe from the plotted residuals, a relationship between 
these residuals and the price control periods should be estimated.  This means we need to 
regress these residuals on the price control periods.  To be able to do so, one needs to include 
five dummy variables for these periods, where each equals one if it is the year or years in 
which the specific price control was applied, and zero otherwise (e.g. for the period 1970, D1 
                                                 
1
  The Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) has been widely used for model identification in time series and 
linear regression.  SIC is an index used as an aid in choosing between competing models.  It was proposed as a 
method for choosing between different models with different numbers of parameters, in order to determine 
which is the “best fit” to the observed data. 
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= 1 for this year, and zero otherwise.  For the period 1971-1972, D2 = 1 for this period, and 
zero otherwise). 
Figure 1 is here 
Following these notions, our model regresses the residuals, plotted in Figure 1, on 
five dummies matching the periods when price controls were applied, and OPEC‟s reserves 
in year (t), with a constant. 
Residt = α0 + α1 Rt + α2 D2 + α3 D3 + α4 D4 + α5 D5 + α6 D6       (1) 
where, Residt is the residuals from the regression of the production levels from 1960 to 2007 
on a time index, Rt is OPEC‟s reserves in year (t), D1 is a dummy variable for the period 1970 
(the base and is dropped), D2 is a dummy variable for the period 1971-1972, D3 is a dummy 
variable for the period 1973, D4 is a dummy variable for the period 1974-1975, D5 is a 
dummy variable for the period 1976-1979, and D6 is a dummy variable for the period 1980-
1988.  The results are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1 is here 
In Table 1, the difference between the coefficients of any two consecutive dummies 
can be interpreted as the difference between the levels of production, on average.  The 
reported coefficients show some evidence that the production levels of OPEC were affected 
by the price controls policies for some periods.   
For the period 1971-1972, the average loss in production amounts to approximately 
1196 (1000 barrel/day) with respect to the previous period in which price controls were used, 
and 3637 (1000 barrel/day) with respect to the following period, and both differences are 
statistically significant (different from zero).   
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For 1973, OPEC increased production, according to the estimated coefficients.  The 
average increase in production amounts to approximately 3637 (1000 barrel/day) with 
respect to the previous period, and to 2183 (1000 barrel/day) with respect to the following 
period, and both differences are statistically significant (different from zero).  This result 
seems odd, given that 1973 is the year in which Arab members of OPEC banned exports to 
western countries and the U.S. due to the 1973 war.  One explanation for this could be that 
the war did not occur until October of that year.  So perhaps these countries, in earlier parts 
of 1973, were planning for the war and increasing oil output to support such activities.  This 
might have led them to expand extraction at the beginning of 1973, and perhaps that‟s what 
the coefficient is capturing. 
This argument can be supported by the estimates on the 1974-1975 periods, when 
production is lower than in the previous or following time periods.  The Arab members of 
OPEC were perhaps still using the ban, and were also responding to the U.S. price control 
policies.  The average loss in production amounts to approximately 2183 (1000 barrel/day) 
with respect to the previous period, and to 3822 (1000 barrel/day) with respect to the 
following period.  Both differences are statistically significant (different from zero).  OPEC‟s 
production levels increased for 1976-1979, and were not affected by the U.S. price control 
policies.  This indicates that OPEC members were trying to recover their foregone revenues 
to address growth needs inside their countries.  Finally, the estimated coefficients show some 
evidence that OPEC responded by cutting production when the U.S. implemented the 
“Windfall Profit Tax”, from 1980-1988.  OPEC cut production by 5593 (1000 barrel/day) on 
average, and this difference is statistically significant.  This result is supported by the work of 
Karp and Newbery (1991), where they found that OPEC will initially have a lower share of 
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current production than of current reserves when the U.S. and other large importers all 
impose optimal import tariffs.  However, through this period (1980-1988), oil prices were 
decreasing (see Figure 2 in the appendix) and these cuts could have been made by OPEC to 
help prices increase, rather than the decline is a response to the Windfall Profit Tax. 
This section shows some evidence that OPEC did respond differently to price controls 
applied by the U.S.  For some periods it cut production, while in other periods production 
levels increased.  Although, these increases or decreases are not related only to the price 
control policies, it still explains some of the variation in production levels. 
IV. Relation between Harm Function and Residuals 
OPEC includes Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.  Following the approach suggested by Wirl 
(2008), these countries can be divided into allies and adversaries, in terms of their relations 
with the West.  Countries like Indonesia, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United 
Arab Emirates are seen as allies to the European countries and the U.S.  Countries like Iran, 
Algeria and Venezuela are considered to be anti-West (until 2003, Iraq and Libya considered 
to be in this group).  Following Wirl (2008), the hypothesis in this paper is that OPEC 
countries do not pursue strict profit maximization.  Indeed, they also seek political support 
among their people.  These countries realize that the Wes depends on OPEC‟s oil; this gives 
them some power of influence.  The people of these countries frequently express anti-
Western sentiments.
2
  For this reason, OPEC countries in need of popular domestic support 
may take production decisions to gain such support.  The statements and interviews that we 
read and watch for Ahmadi Nejad of Iran and Chavez of Venezuela are good examples of 
these policies.  Even countries considered to be allies must still secure the support of their 
                                                 
2
 They disagree primarily with the American and European policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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people, some of whom also have anti-Western sentiments.  Such countries (allies) may adopt 
a moderate anti-Western policy.  With the political consideration in mind, OPEC countries 
will be assumed to maximize the net present value of benefits, where benefits are derived 
from oil profits as well as political support, based on the degree to which the west is harmed.  
Following Wirl (2008), let the political support among citizens of the country be St.  
Political support is a function of the adverse effect on the West of higher oil prices, so St is 
the harm function.
3
  This harm function depends on the quantity of oil extracted and supplied 
to the market, and on an indicator, αt, that measures the desire of OPEC to harm the West.  
The harm function can be written as: St = f (qt , αt )              (2) 
OPEC is able to harm the western countries and the U.S. by cutting production and raising 
the price.  Recall that OPEC has direct control over quantity not price, as the latter is 
determined in the market.   
The political support (St) will increase as (qt) is cut or if the desire to harm (αt) is stronger.  
This means:  
∂St /∂qt < 0            (3) 
∂St /∂ αt > 0            (4) 
Using these notions, a simple form of the harm function with appropriate properties is: 
St = αt / (1 + qt)                              (5) 
 
Equation (5) implies that the harm decreases when OPEC increases quantities (one in 
the denominator avoids the case of infinity when quantity is zero).  Also the harm increases 
with a higher desire to harm, αt.  If OPEC has no desire to harm anyone, then αt = zero and 
                                                 
3
  Citizens of the Middle East and some Latin Americans believe that the US policy is targeting them, and that it 
ignores the good aspects of their countries. This is why most of them consider themselves to be “Anti West“. 
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the harm function vanishes, meaning that OPEC just maximizes profits like any other 
producer in any market with no other considerations in mind. 
Since one of the factors that might affect the secular trend for OPEC‟s production 
levels is this desire to harm the west, we can obtain an estimate of αt by estimating the 
relationship:  
Residt = α0 + α1 {1/ (1 + qt)}          (6) 
and taking the estimate of α1 as a measure of αt.  This relationship also explores the relation 
between the residuals and the harm function.  The idea is that the harm function might have 
affected OPEC‟s decisions regarding oil extraction.  If this is the case, then one should 
expect to find a relation between these residuals and the harm function.  The estimates of the 
regression are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2 is here 
The results show that the coefficient for the harm function is negative and a large 
number, although it is not significant.  This is consistent with the results found in Kisswani 
(2009), where the net present value of profits increases with a large value of the harm 
indicator, αt.  The regression outcome here also provides some evidence that OPEC considers 
the harm function when it comes to oil extraction.  This part provides some evidence that 
OPEC members did consider the support of their citizens in deciding on production levels, 
and this support, which is represented by the harm function, needed OPEC to cut production 
as a response to the U.S. price controls. 
V. Conclusions 
The arguents in this paper provide some evidence that OPEC did respond to the price 
controls applied by the U.S., but not in a uniform way.  For some periods it cut production, 
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while in other periods production levels increased.  Since this is the case, the U.S. may 
consider different policies to address high oil prices, especially since price control policies 
also have adverse effects on welfare.  Also the analysis gives some support to the idea that 
OPEC members consider the support of their citizens when deciding on production levels.  
However, most of those citizens are to be Anti-Western.  Therefore, the U.S. and the West 
should review their policy in the region to improve relations with OPEC‟s governments.  
Beside they need to communicate better with the people of OPEC countries, since they are 
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TABLE 1: Regression of Residuals on OPEC Reserves and Price Control Dummies 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust  
Std. Err.       
t - values 
    
OPEC‟s reserves 0.0007 0.001      0.49    
    
Dummy for  1971-1972 -1539.34***    600.76     -2.56    
    
Dummy for  1973 2097.37***   582.46      3.97    
    
Dummy for  1974-1975 -85.21    1371.69     -0.06    
    
Dummy for  1976-1979 3736.75***    804.84      4.64    
    
Dummy for  1980-1988 -1856.53**    865.51     -2.15    
    
Constant -343.42 1066.62 -0.32 
    
R-squared      0.39   
Number of observations 48   
-The dependent variable is the residuals of regressing the production levels from 1960 to 2007 on a 
time index.  The table reports the coefficients of the regression of these residuals on the five dummies 
and OPEC‟s reserves, with a constant. 
- Year 1970 is the base. 
-Robust standard errors and t-values are reported in the table. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 






TABLE 2: Regression of Residuals on Harm Function 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust  
Std. Err.       
t - values 
1/ (1 + qt) - 2.37 e+07 1.78e+07     -1.33    
    
Constant 1146.75 863.31 1.33    
    
R-squared      0.04   
Number of observations 48   
-The dependent variable is the residuals of regressing the production levels from 1960 to 2007 on a 
time index.  The table reports the coefficients of the regression of these residuals on the harm function, 
with a constant.  
-Robust standard errors and t-values are reported in the table. 
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Appendix:  Figure 2 
 
 
 
